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Abstract
In this paper we analyze the Lisbon performance of the countries of the 
European Union from a long-term, structural perspective.
It again turns out that first of all things get worse, before they get better – 
the old wisdom of classical development economics (Kuznets) and political 
science modernization theory of the postwar period. In addition, it emerges that 
foreign savings, “economic freedom”, low comparative international price levels, 
and World Bank type pension reforms are not compatible with a solid and long-
run development path, based on our knowledge of 17 component variables, 
integrating the dimensions growth, environment, human rights, basic human 
needs satisfaction, and gender equality. In addition, European Union membership 
(EU-15, “old Europe”) has the numerically highest negative effect on the global 
Lisbon process; while Muslim population shares in no way bloc the development 
process, on the contrary. Neo-liberal globalization strategies are condemned to 
failure; while European decision makers in particular would be strongly advised 
to re-think their Lisbon strategy, which pushes countries towards accepting 
strategies, which, inter alia, lower instead of increase the comparative 
international price level. Is a price level of say, the Congo’s dimension, really the 
aim of the Lisbon process? 
Balassa and Samuelson assumed that rising international price levels for 
the periphery country are a precondition of positive development. Falling relative 
price levels would suggest in the neo-classical argument that the price of the non-
tradables in the European economy decreased dramatically over time. 
Structuralist economists, like Stanford Professor emeritus Pan Yotopoulos, 
usually warn the weaker countries of the periphery that:“Currency substitution 
represents an asymmetric demand from Mexicans to hold dollars as a store of 
value, a demand that is not reciprocated by Americans holding pesos as a hedge 
against the devaluation of the dollar!” (Yotopoulos and Sawada, 2005). 
In addition to the above specified dependency theory and world systems 
theory arguments, urbanization positively affects Lisbon Process Index Indicator. 
Ceteris paribus, World Bank pension reforms will be negatively related to the 
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process: Pushing Europe downwards the path of falling comparative prices will 
only increase the growth impediments of the growingly multicultural Europe. 
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Introduction 
Is globalization a general receipt for a sound and successful development, 
especially of the new member states of the European Union? Or is there a lesson 
to be learnt from the experience of the world periphery and semi-periphery, and 
from dependency research, which – like the works of Osvaldo Sunkel – is 
generally critical about the long-term polarizing social effects of relations of 
dependency? 
As it is well known, in March 2000, the EU Heads of States and 
Governments agreed to make the EU "the most competitive and dynamic 
knowledge-driven economy by 2010". Although some progress was made on 
innovating Europe's economy, there is growing concern that the reform process is 
not going fast enough and that the ambitious targets will not be reached
2
. As it is 
also widely known, the 14 main structural “Lisbon” agenda indicators, created to 
measure progress in meeting the Lisbon targets, play an important role in 
European policy making
3
. The Lisbon lists of indicators, apart from the highly 
publicized debt-related Maastricht criteria of the European Monetary Union, are 
perhaps the most important checklists for government success or failure in Europe 
today. They are omni-present in the public political as well as scientific debate 
and are defined by Eurostat as: 
List of Lisbon indicators: 
1. GDP per capita in PPS 
2. Labor productivity 
3. Employment rate 
4. Employment rate of older workers 
5. Educational attainment (20-24) 
6. Research and Development expenditure 
                                           
2 For a short survey of the Lisbon process, see also: 
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7. Comparative “price levels” (developed on the basis of the ERD-Index 
Yotopoulos et al.)
4
 (the Commission maintaining that a low value is a 
good result) 
8. Business investment 
9. At risk-of-poverty rate (low value = good result) 
10. Long-term unemployment rate (low value = good result) 
11. Dispersion of regional employment rates (low value = good result) 
12. Greenhouse gas emissions (low value = good result) 
13. Energy intensity of the economy (low value = good result) 
14. Volume of freight transport (low value = good result) 
It is assumed that a good performance on one indicator is causally linked 
to a good performance on the other indicators. Or in the words of Professor 
Romano Prodi, the former Commission President: “The Lisbon Strategy remains 
the right course for an enlarged European Union. It is the best way of delivering 
what concerns our citizens most - prosperity, more and better jobs, greater social 
cohesion and a cleaner environment - and making sure that they are achieved 
sustainably for future generations.” 
(http://www.socialdialogue.net/en/en_lib_068.htm) 
But a recent study by the European Commission (2005a) warns that it is 
very difficult to quantify the impact of the reforms because of the "heterogeneity" 
of individual reform measures, time lags in implementation and 
complementarities and trade-offs between reforms. The Commission classifies the 
Lisbon reforms into five categories: 
1. product and capital market reforms; 
2. investments in the knowledge-based economy; 
3. labor market reforms; 
4. social policy reforms; 
5. environmental policy reforms. 
The main theories and the research design 
European Union policy making nowadays makes basic neo-liberal 
assumptions, like the one that a low comparative international price level is good 
for socio-economic development. Dependency and later world systems theory, 
going back to its four “founding fathers” Samir Amin, Giovanni Arrighi, Andre 
Gunder Frank and Immanuel Wallerstein, ascent and decline in world society is 
largely being determined in our age by the following ‘five monopolies’: 
 the monopoly of technology, supported by military expenditures of the 
dominant nations 
                                           
4 It can be shown that the Eurostat data series GDP PPP per capita/GDP exchange rate per 
capita (EU-25=100), used for the “price level”, in reality measure GDP exchange rate per 
capita/GDP PPP per capita (EU-25=100).  
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 the monopoly of control over global finances and a strong position in the 
hierarchy of current account balances 
 the monopoly of access to natural resources 
 the monopoly over international communication and the media 
 the monopoly of the military means of mass destruction. 
 
Let us also recall, that for Amin (1975), there are four main characteristics 
of the peripheral societal formation: 
 the predominance of agrarian capitalism in the ‘national’ sector 
 the formation of a local bourgeoisie, which is dependent from foreign 
capital, especially in the trading sector 
 the tendency of bureaucratization 
 specific and incomplete forms of proletarization of the labor force. 
In partial accordance with liberal thought, (i) and (iii) explain the tendency 
towards low savings; thus there will be: 
 huge state sector deficits and, in addition, their ‘twin’: 
 chronic current account balance deficits in the peripheral countries.  
High imports of the periphery, and hence, in the long run, capital imports, 
are the consequence of the already existing structural deformations of the role of 
peripheries in the world system, namely by:     
 rapid urbanization, combined with an insufficient local production of food 
 excessive expenditures of the local bureaucracies 
 changes in income distribution to the benefit of the local elites 
(demonstration effects) 
 insufficient growth of and structural imbalances in the industrial sector 
 and the following reliance on foreign assistance 
The history of periphery capitalism, Amin argues, is full of short-term 
‘miracles’ and long-term blocks, stagnation and even regression.
While mass demand and reforms in the agricultural structures were 
responsible for the transition from the tributary mode of production in Western 
Europe to capitalism from the Long 16
th
 Century onwards, periphery capitalism 
was and is characterized by the following main tendencies (Amin, 1973 - 1997): 
 regression in both agriculture and small scale industry characterizes the 
period after the onslaught of foreign domination and colonialism 
 unequal international specialization of the periphery leads to the 
concentration of activities in export oriented agriculture and or mining. 
Some industrialization of the periphery is possible under the condition of 
low wages, which, together with rising productivity, determine that 
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unequal exchange sets in (double factorial terms of trade < 1.0; see Raffer, 
1987)
 these structures determine in the long run a rapidly growing tertiary sector 
with hidden unemployment and the rising importance of rent in the overall 
social and economic system 
 the development blocks of peripheral capitalism (chronic current account 
balance deficits, re-exported profits of foreign investments, deficient 
business cycles of the periphery, which provide important markets for the 
centers during world economic upswings) 
 structural imbalances in the political and social relationships, inter alia a
strong ‘compradore’ element and the rising importance of state capitalism 
and an indebted state class.  
The dependency and world system paradigm of course does not go 
uncontested. A recent very thorough liberal globalist flagship synopsis of the 
quantitative peace- and development research evidence over the last decades by 
de Soysa and Gleditsch (2002) maintains however that globalization, especially 
openness to trade and foreign direct investment, leads towards 
a) increased democracy 
b) development 
c) less inequality 
d) a better environment 
e) peace. 
De Soysa and Gleditsch would say: the banlieues in France and countries 
like Madagascar in Africa or Myanmar in Asia remained so poor because France 
– or Madagascar and Myanmar – did not sufficiently open up to the world 
economy, while countries like Singapore did. World market open capitalism is 
compatible with social cohesion, indeed it would be one if it’s main preconditions. 
The "Washington Consensus", which indeed is the policy consensus of 
leading Western nations after the downfall of Communism, has been summarized 
by Raffer (pp. 305 - 323 in Tausch, 2003) as to represent the following policy 
priorities: 
1. Fiscal discipline: a primary budget surplus of several percent of GDP 
2. Public expenditure priorities: defined as re-directions of public expenditures 
towards fields with high economic returns such as primary health and education 
3. Tax reform: cutting marginal tax rates 
4. Financial liberalization: moderately positive real interest rates and the abolition 
of preferential interest rates (such as for developmentally useful or socially 
demanded projects) 
5. Exchange rates: unified and competitive 
6. Trade liberalization: abolishing quotas (replacing them by tariffs) and reducing 
tariffs to a uniform low level within three to ten years.  
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7. Foreign direct investment: equal treatment with domestic firms. The World 
Bank calls this the elimination of barriers. This principle is also enshrined in the 
WTO treaties.  
8. Privatization 
9. Deregulation: abolishing regulations aiming at achieving developmental or 
social aims 
10. Property rights: must be guaranteed. 
Literature, supporting the “Washington Consensus” now abounds, 
highlighting pro-market policies and world economic openness as strategies for 
social and economic well-being, social justice and economic growth, and a 
peaceful world [for a survey, see Tausch and Ghymers, 2007]. 
The counter-position, advanced by globalization critics, environmentalists, 
liberation theologians of all denominations, and - most recently - dissidents from 
the once homogeneous neo-liberal camp would hold that unfettered globalization 
increases the social gaps between rich and poor both within countries as well as 
on a global scale. Most of the adherents of this camp would share the view that 
income distribution in the world system has worsened during the period of 
globalization. Indeed, the challenge by dependency theory to the neo-classical 
consensus is a real one – especially in a time of relative stagnation in the centers 
and social polarization in many countries of the periphery.
Dependency authors generally explain backwardness and stagnation by the 
ever-growing dependent insertion of these countries into the world economy. 
Starting with the writings of Prebisch, Rothschild and Sunkel, their leading 
spokespersons all would stress the unequal and socially imbalanced nature of 
development in regions that are highly dependent on investment from the highly 
developed countries, even in the richer countries of the European Union. Short-
term spurts of growth notwithstanding, long-term growth will be imbalanced and 
unequal, and will tend towards high negative current account balances.  
Later world system analyses – that started with the writings of the Austro-
Hungarian socialist Karl Polanyi after the First World War - tended to confirm 
and expand this dependency argument. Capitalism in the periphery, like in the 
center, is characterized by strong cyclical fluctuations, and there are centers, semi-
peripheries and peripheries. The rise of one group of semi-peripheries tends to be 
at the cost of another group, but the unequal structure of the world economy based 
on unequal transfer tends to remain stable.  
So is, then, the poverty, in say, the „banlieues“ in today’s France an 
immediate consequence of industrial restructuring, which takes place, and 
transfers jobs in an increasing number to the new member countries of the 
European East? Authors from the world system approach tended to discard the 
“culturalist” explanations of the malaise in the „banlieues“ , offered by 
Huntington, and rather would support the argument that world economic position, 
and not culture, determines conflict. The massive world systems literature 
continues to be a stream of the scientific debate subsisting at the major 
Universities, publishing houses and scholarly journals around the world, the near 
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complete global triumph of the neo-liberal theory notwithstanding [for an 
exhaustive bibliography on the subject, see, again Tausch and Ghymers, 2006]. 
Dependency and world system theory generally hold that poverty and 
backwardness in poor countries and in poor regions of rich countries are caused 
by the peripheral or quasi-position that these nations or regions have in the 
international division of labor. Ever since the capitalist world system evolved, 
there is a stark distinction between the nations of the center and the nations of the 
periphery. Fernando Henrique Cardoso summarized the quantifiable essence of 
dependency theories as follows: 
 there is a financial and technological penetration by the developed 
capitalist centers of the countries of the periphery and semi-periphery 
 this produces an unbalanced economic structure both within the peripheral 
societies and between them and the centers 
 this leads to limitations on self-sustained growth in the periphery 
 this favors the appearance of specific patterns of class relations 
 these require modifications in the role of the state to guarantee both the 
functioning of the economy and the political articulation of a society, 
which contains, within itself, foci of inarticulateness and structural 
imbalance (Cardoso, 1979) 
It seems to be important at this point to emphasize that our three indicators 
of dependency measure three different types of “dependent development”:  
 MNC penetration measures the different degrees of weight that foreign 
capital investments have in the host countries, i.e. the UNCTAD 
percentages of the stocks of multinational corporation investments per 
total host country GDP 
 Unequal exchange (ERD or ERDI) measures the degree, to which 
globalization has contributed to lowering the international price level of a 
country; i.e. it is an indicator about the openness of the price system vis-à-
vis the pressures of globalization. The result of this is an unequal transfer 
from the peripheries to the centers, which used to be high-price countries 
until very recently. ERD is calculated by the ratio between GDP at 
purchasing power parities, divided by GDP at current exchange rates 
 For dependency authors, foreign savings show the weight that foreign 
savings, mostly from the centers and richer semi-peripheries, have in the 
accumulation process of the host countries in the periphery and semi-
periphery. It is calculated by the difference between the share of 
investments per GDP and the share of savings per GDP. 
Our theoretical survey should include two processes, being of great 
importance especially to the European continent and the amount of social 
cohesion or social exclusion, with which Europe is confronted. One is the obvious 
argument about the European Union as a determining factor of European 
development patterns, for good or for bad. There are very diverse views nowadays 
on the European Union. As a research paper, published in the journal 
“Parameters” of the US Army, maintains (Wilkie, 2003): “Still, there are those 
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on both sides of the Atlantic who believe that the European Union, as an old-
fashioned socialist bureaucracy, is “fundamentally unreformable” and also 
culturally hostile to the United States” (Wilkie, 2003: 46)
5
The well-known acceleration and maturity effects of development have to 
be qualified in an important way. Ever since the days of Simon Kuznets, 
development researchers have applied curve-linear formulations in order to 
capture these effects. The curve-linear function of growth, being regressed on the 
natural logarithm of development level and its square, is sometimes called the 
'Matthew's effect' following Matthew's (13, 12): 'For whosoever hath, to him shall 
be given, and he shall have more abundance: but whosoever hath not, for him 
shall be taken away even that he hath'
Social scientists interpreted this effect mainly in view of an acceleration of 
economic growth in middle-income countries vis-à-vis the poor countries and in 
view of the still widening gap between the poorest periphery nations ('have-nots')
and the 'haves' among the semi-periphery countries (Jackman, 1982). Kuznets was 
the first to introduce a “light at the end of the tunnel” vision on the development 
of inequality: first things get worse, before they become better at later “stages” of 
development. 
We also should mention here the variable “pension reform.” Proponents
and critics of fully funded, three-pillar pension models alike agree on the fact that 
pension reform policy is one of the biggest challenges that especially advanced 
democracies with their age structure are facing in world society. To neglect 
pension funds in investigations about the capitalist world economy would be 
misleading. Private pension funds already amount to 44 % of current world GDP, 
with countries like the United States; Japan; United Kingdom; Netherlands; 
Canada; Switzerland; Australia; Sweden; Ireland; Finland; and Denmark taking 
the lead in fund development either via the introduction of a “World Bank” three 
pillar pension model or simply via a strong element of private pensions (“the third 
pillar”) besides the first, traditional PAYGO pillar (like presently in the United 
States of America). Slow pension fund development in most countries of the €-
zone determines that the overall share of private pension funds from the €-zone is 
just over 2 % of world GDP. If Europe wants to fulfill its Lisbon agenda of 
catching up with the United States, it must, the argument runs, overhaul its 
pension systems and introduce some form or other of private pension funds, 
which are a major force in financing technological advance in the capitalist world 
economy today [see Tausch, 2003]. 
In the following, we will present quantitative research, which will present 
results which could be of importance for the future of the political strategy debate 
in Europe in the context of the “Lisbon agenda”. Is ultra-capitalism and ultra-neo-
liberalism the only policy option left for the European continent? 
The independent variables of our model for around the year 2000 or later 
comprised the following list.  
 development level ln (GDP PPP pc). This variable should control for the 
effects of rising incomes on development (UNDP HDR, 2000) 
                                           
5 http://carlisle-www. army. mil/usawc/Parameters/02winter/wilkie. htm 
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 development level, square (maturity effects) ln (GDP PPP pc)^2. This 
variable should control for the effects of economic maturity on 
development (UNDP HDR, 2000) 
 Dummy: landlocked country
6
 (Easterly, 2002) 
 Dummy: transition country
7
 (Easterly, 2002) 
 EU-15-membership (EU member by the year 2000, dummy variable) 
 Foreign saving (I-S)/GNP (calculated from UNDP 2000) 
 MNC PEN 1995 (UNCTAD World Investment Report, current issues) 
 Percentage of Muslims per total population (Nationmaster
8
)
 state interventionism (absence of economic freedom; Heritage Foundation 
and Wall Street Journal website for economic freedom
9
, by around 2000) 
 unequal transfer (calculated from UNDP, concept: ERDI, reciprocal value 
of comparative “price levels” (developed on the basis of the ERD-Index 
Yotopoulos et al.)
10
 (the Commission maintaining that a low value is good 
result) (UNDP HDR, 2000) 
 Urbanisation
11
 (Easterly 2002) 
 World Bank pension reform
12
 (World Bank sources, quoted in Tausch 
(Ed.), 2003) 
The dependent variables for this analysis correspond to standard 
knowledge in comparative political science and sociology. Although we presume 
the indicators as to be known generally, we present for our readers a brief 
summary of the Happy Planet Indicators, available from 
http://www.happyplanetindex.org/list.htm, the UNDP indicators and the 
Yale/Columbia environmental data series. We used this list to construct a single 
“global Lisbon process” indicator. 
                                           
6 Taken from William Easterly, EXCEL data file freely available at 
http://www.cgdev.org/doc/expert%20pages/easterly/easterly_consensusdata.xls  
7 Taken from William Easterly, EXCEL data file freely available at 
http://www.cgdev.org/doc/expert%20pages/easterly/easterly_consensusdata.xls  
8 See nationmaster.com at http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/rel_isl_per_mus-religion-islam-
percentage-muslim 
9 These data are contained in http://www.freetheworld.com/; also: 
http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/. We used the latter website as the source of our 
data. It has to be kept in mind that the “worst” countries on the economic freedom scale have the 
numerically highest values, while the best countries have the numerically lowest values. Lao 
People's Dem. Rep. – the economically “unfreest” country in our sample, has the numerical value 
4.6, while the economically freest country, Singapore, scores 1.45. We thus decided to call our 
indicator “state interventionism” 
10 it can be shown that the Eurostat data series GDP PPP per capita/GDP exchange rate per 
capita (EU-25=100), used for the “price level”, in reality measure GDP exchange rate per 
capita/GDP PPP per capita (EU-25=100).  
11 Taken from William Easterly, EXCEL data file freely available at 
http://www.cgdev.org/content/expert/detail/2699/  
12 Argentina; Australia; Bolivia; Chile; Colombia; Croatia; Denmark; El Salvador; Hungary; 
Kazakhstan; Mexico; Netherlands; Peru; Poland; Sweden; Switzerland; United Kingdom; 
Uruguay 
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The dependent variables were measured, if not specified otherwise, by 
around 2000. The list of the dependent variables, to be projected onto a combined 
and single indicator, comprises 
1. economic growth, 1990-2003 (UNDP HDR, 2005) 
2. eco-social market economy (GDP output per kg energy use) (UNDP 
HDR 2000) 
3. female economic activity rate as % of male economic activity rate 
(UNDP HDR 2000) 
4. freedom from % people not expected to survive age 60 (UNDP HDR 
2000)
5. freedom from a high ecological Footprint, 204 (Happy Planet 
Organization)
6. freedom from a high quintile ratio (share of income/consumption 
richest 20% to poorest 20%) (UNDP HDR 2005) 
7. freedom from civil liberty violations, 1998, and 2006 (Easterly, 2002, 
and Freedom House, 2007) 
8. freedom from high CO2 emissions per capita (UNDP HDR 2000) 
9. freedom from political rights violations, 1998, and 2006 (Easterly, 
2002, and Freedom House, 2007) 
10. freedom from unemployment, 2003 (UN statistical system website, 
social indicators) 
11. Gender development index 2004 (UNDP HDR, 2006) 
12. Gender empowerment index, 2004 (UNDP HDR, 2006) 
13. Happy Planet Index, 2004  (Happy Planet Organization) 
14. Human development Index, 2005 (UNDP HDR 2005) 
15. life expectancy, 1995-2000 (UNDP HDR 2000) 
16. Life Satisfaction, 2004 (Happy Planet Organization) 
17. the Yale/Columbia
13
 environmental sustainability index (ESI-Index), 
2005
The choice of a country to be included in the final analysis (134 
countries
14
) was determined by the availability of a complete data series for these 
independent variables (if not mentioned otherwise, UNDP data). 
                                           
13 http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/es/esi/. The EXCEL spreadsheet for 2005 is freely available 
from this site 
14 Albania; Algeria; Angola; Argentina; Armenia; Australia; Austria; Azerbaijan; Bahrain; 
Bangladesh; Belarus; Belgium; Belize; Benin; Bolivia; Botswana; Brazil; Bulgaria; Burkina 
Faso; Burundi; Cambodia; Cameroon; Canada; Chad; Chile; China; Colombia; Congo; Congo, 
Dem. Rep. of the; Costa Rica; Côte d'Ivoire; Croatia; Cyprus; Czech Republic; Denmark; 
Dominican Republic; Ecuador; Egypt; Estonia; Ethiopia; Fiji; Finland; France; Gabon; Gambia; 
Georgia; Germany; Ghana; Greece; Guatemala; Guinea; Guinea-Bissau; Guyana; Haiti; 
Honduras; Hungary; Iceland; India; Indonesia; Iran, Islamic Rep. of; Ireland; Israel; Italy; 
Jamaica; Japan; Jordan; Kazakhstan; Kenya; Korea, Rep. of; Kyrgyzstan; Lao People's Dem.  
Rep.; Latvia; Lebanon; Lesotho; Lithuania; Luxembourg; Madagascar; Malawi; Malaysia; Mali; 
Mauritania; Mauritius; Mexico; Moldova, Rep. of; Mongolia; Morocco; Mozambique; Namibia; 
Nepal; Netherlands; New Zealand; Niger; Nigeria; Norway; Pakistan; Panama; Papua New 
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These variables correspond to the following dimensions: 
World economic openness and globalization 
foreign saving [(I-S)/GNP] 
low comparative international price level [ERD] 
state interventionism (absence of economic. freedom) 
transnational capital penetration [MNC PEN 1995] 
Percentage of the population adhering to the Muslim faith 
Membership in the European Union 
Geography
Dummy for being landlocked 
Urbanization ratio, 1990 
Recent world economic history 
Dummy for transition economy 
Development level and development level squared [ln(GDP PPP pc) and ln (GDP 
PPP pc)^2] 
Pension Reform efforts 
World Bank pension reform 
The list of our core dependent variables is multidimensional. 
Democracy and human rights 
Absence of democracy: political rights and civil rights violations (based on 
Freedom House, 2000, reported in Easterly, 2002 and Freedom House, 2007) 
                                                                                                                       
Guinea; Paraguay; Peru; Philippines; Poland; Portugal; Romania; Russian Federation; Rwanda; 
Saudi Arabia; Senegal; Singapore; Slovakia; Slovenia; South Africa; Spain; Sri Lanka; 
Swaziland; Sweden; Switzerland; Syrian Arab Republic; Tajikistan; Tanzania, U. Rep. of; 
Thailand; Togo; Trinidad and Tobago; Tunisia; Turkey; Uganda; United Kingdom; United States; 
Uruguay; Uzbekistan; Venezuela; Viet Nam; Yemen; Zambia; Zimbabwe 
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Environment 
CO2 emissions per capita 
ESI-Index ((Yale/Columbia environment sustainability index project website) 
GDP output per kg energy use (“eco-social market economy”
15
)
Ecological Footprint
16
Happy Planet Index
17
Human development and basic human needs satisfaction 
% people not expected to survive age 60 
human development index 
life expectancy, 1995-2000 
Life Satisfaction
18
Gender justice 
Gender development index 2004 (UNDP HDR, 2006) 
Gender empowerment index, 2004 (UNDP HDR, 2006) 
female economic activity rate as % of male economic activity rate (UNDP HDR 
2000)
Redistribution, growth and employment policies 
economic growth 1990-2003 
share of income/consumption richest 20% to poorest 20% 
unemployment 2003 (from United Nations statistical website) 
In Graph 1, we summarize our vision of the “global Lisbon process” from 
what is known from the international indicators. The dimension of human rights 
and gender equality is conspicuously absent from the original Lisbon 14 list. Our 
list, by contrast, integrates the five dimensions growth, environment, human 
rights, basic human needs, and gender equality. 
                                           
15 This term is most probably an Austrian invention. The governing Conservative People’s Party – 
to be precise, its former Chairman Dr. Josef Riegler – seems to have invented this term in the late 
1980s. For more on that debate: 
http://www.nachhaltigkeit.at/bibliothek/pdf/Factsheet11OekosozMarktw.pdf; and Michael Rösch, 
Tubingen University at http://tiss.zdv.uni-
tuebingen.de/webroot/sp/spsba01_W98_1/germany1b.htm. As an indicator of the reconciliation 
between the price mechanism and the environment we propose the indicator GDP output per kg 
energy use; the term ‘eco-social market economy’ neatly grasps all the aspects of this empirical 
formulation 
16 http://www.happyplanetindex.org/list.htm 
17 http://www.happyplanetindex.org/list.htm 
18 http://www.happyplanetindex.org/list.htm 
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(Equation 1) Lisbon process, combining the development performance 1990 
- end 1990s of all the variables, mentioned in Graph 1 = a1 +- b1*first part curvilinear 
function of development level +- b2*second part curvilinear function of 
development level +- b3.. . *stock of transnational investment per GDP (UNCTAD) 
mid 1990s +- b4.. . * comparative price levels (ERDI) +- b5.. . * foreign saving +- b6.. . *
dummy transition economy +-b7 * percentage of the population adhering to the 
Muslim faith +- b8 * European Union membership +- b9 * state interventionism +- 
b10 * urbanisation +- b11 * dummy landlocked country+- b12 * dummy World 
Bank pension reform +- b13* net migration rate per total population, 1950 - 2000 
The “Lisbon process” for us is constituted in the following way: 
Graph 1: the “global Lisbon process” 
To evaluate the global Lisbon indicators at once, we constructed a UNDP-
type index from the data. Such UNDP type indicators are based on a simple 
principle, designed in the 1990s by Nobel laureate Amartya Sen: if you want to 
combine 2 or more variables to an indicator, calculate for each of the variables a 
dimension index, using the formula (UNDP, 2005): 
(2) Dimension index = (actual value – minimum value) / (maximum value 
– minimum value)  
Calculating the famous “Human Development Index” of the United 
Nations Human Development Programme, one is supposed to proceed in the 
following way. According to formula (1), one first has to calculate a life 
expectancy component, called “life expectancy index”. Then, the same formula is 
used for an “education index”, based on the figures for adult literacy and gross 
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enrollment (the weight for adult literacy is 2/3, and 1/3 for gross enrollment). The 
“GDP index” is now based on a small alteration of formula (1), working with the 
log GDP. In earlier years, the UNDP worked exactly with formula (1). Today, the 
UNDP calculates according to the following formula: 
(2a) GDP index = (log (actual value GDP PPP per capita) minus log 
(100))/(log (maximum value GDP PPP per capita) minus log (100)) 
The UNDP HDI then will be the combined result of 
(3) Human development index = 1/3 * (life expectancy index) + 1/3 * 
(education index) + 1/3 * (GDP index) 
In our case, we calculated, the 17 different dimension indices for the 
global Lisbon process, using formula 1. Due to missing values, we were satisfied 
with simply calculating the means from the 17 available different components: 
 (4a) Global Lisbon Index = the means from  
 component index for the dimension economic growth, 1990-2003 (UNDP 
HDR, 2005) 
 component index for the dimension eco-social market economy (GDP 
output per kg energy use) (UNDP HDR 2000) 
 component index for the dimension female economic activity rate as % of 
male economic activity rate (UNDP HDR 2000) 
 component index for the dimension freedom from % people not expected 
to survive age 60 (UNDP HDR 2000) 
 component index for the dimension freedom from a high ecological 
Footprint, 204 (Happy Planet Organization) 
 component index for the dimension freedom from a high quintile ratio 
(share of income/consumption richest 20% to poorest 20%) 
(UNDP HDR 2005) 
 component index for the dimension freedom from civil liberty violations, 
1998 (Easterly, 2002) 
 component index for the dimension freedom from high CO2 emissions per 
capita (UNDP HDR 2000) 
 component index for the dimension freedom from political rights 
violations, 1998 (Easterly, 2002) 
 component index for the dimension freedom from unemployment, 2003 
(UN statistical system website, social indicators) 
 component index for the dimension Gender development index 2004 
(UNDP HDR, 2006) 
 component index for the dimension Gender empowerment index, 2004 
(UNDP HDR, 2006) 
 component index for the dimension Happy Planet Index, 2004  (Happy 
Planet Organization) 
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 component index for the dimension Human development Index, 2005 
(UNDP HDR 2005) 
 component index for the dimension life expectancy, 1995-2000 (UNDP 
HDR 2000) 
 component index for the dimension Life Satisfaction, 2004 (Happy Planet 
Organization)
 component index for the dimension the Yale/Columbia  environmental 
sustainability index (ESI-Index), 2005 
Needless to say, that the global Lisbon indicator and the UINDP Human 
Development Indicator are closely interrelated. Our measure is also well 
interrelated with the Yale Columbia Environment Sustainability Index and also 
the Life Satisfaction Index: 
Graph 2: The Global Lisbon Process and its relationship with other important, 
combined international indicators 
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The Global Lisbon Index and Life Satisfaction
y = 6,7645x + 1,9135
R
2
 = 0,5297
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9
Global Lisbon Index (17 components)
L
if
e 
S
at
is
fa
ct
io
n
Global Lisbon Process and the ESI Index
y = 31,459e
0,787x
R
2
 = 0,366
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9
Global Lisbon Process
E
S
I 
(E
n
v
ir
o
n
m
en
t 
S
u
st
ai
n
ab
il
it
y
 I
n
d
ex
)
Conclusions
What are the significant predictors (error p equal or <.10) of the global 
Lisbon Process? It again turns out that first of all things get worse, before they get 
better – the old wisdom of classical development economics (Kuznets) and 
political science modernization theory of the postwar period. In addition, it 
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emerges that foreign savings, “economic freedom”, low comparative international 
price levels, and World Bank type pension reforms are not compatible with a solid 
and long-run development path, based on our knowledge of 17 component 
variables, integrating the dimensions growth, environment, human rights, basic 
human needs satisfaction, and gender equality. In addition, European Union 
membership (EU-15, “old Europe”) has the numerically highest negative effect on 
the global Lisbon process; while Muslim population shares in no way bloc the 
development process, on the contrary. Our regression analysis has excellent 
statistical properties; the F value is above 25.00; and the R^2 exceeds in each case 
7/10. Neo-liberal globalization strategies are condemned to failure; while 
European decision makers in particular would be strongly advised to re-think their 
Lisbon strategy, which pushes countries towards accepting strategies, which, inter 
alia, lower instead of increase the comparative international price level. In our 
sample, the countries with the lowest comparative price level were the Congo 
(Dem. Rep. of the); Kyrgyzstan; Ethiopia; Nepal; Lao People's Dem. Rep.; 
Moldova, Rep. of; Cambodia; Viet Nam; Angola; India; Azerbaijan; while the 
classical high-price countries are: Switzerland; Japan; Denmark; Luxembourg; 
Norway; Singapore; Sweden; Germany; France; Finland; Austria; Netherlands; 
Iceland; Belgium; United Kingdom; United States; Italy; Israel; Australia; Ireland; 
Spain; New Zealand; Greece; Lebanon; Canada; and Portugal. Is a price level of 
say, the Congo’s dimension, really the aim of the Lisbon process? 
Balassa and Samuelson assumed that rising international price levels for 
the periphery country are a precondition of positive development. The ultraliberal 
underlying assumptions of the current Commission, member governments and 
Eurostat on the subject were already implied by Rao, who mentioned in a UNDP 
paper, back in 1998 that neo-liberal economics sustain the expectation of a 
growing price convergence from growing globalization (Rao J. M., 1998: 14-15).
Falling relative price levels in countries like Germany over the last years would 
suggest in the neo-classical argument that the price of the non-tradables in the 
German economy decreased dramatically over time. Structuralist economists, like 
Stanford Professor emeritus Pan Yotopoulos, usually warn the weaker countries 
of the periphery that: “Currency substitution represents an asymmetric demand 
from Mexicans to hold dollars as a store of value, a demand that is not 
reciprocated by Americans holding pesos as a hedge against the devaluation of 
the dollar!” (Yotopoulos and Sawada, 2005)
Their argument, which they established in a 1999 paper, refined in their 
2005 analysis, was the so-called Y-Proposition, and this Y-position is very 
relevant today:  “in free currency markets hard currencies fluctuate, while soft 
currencies depriciate systematically (...) The alternative scenario deprives 
devaluation of any of its remedial properties that in the conventional view lead to 
a process of stable interactions and equilibrium....” 
Yotopoulos and other critics think that the basic problem of international 
currency markets is asymmetric reputation. This process of asymmetric reputation 
of the periphery deepens the cycle of underdevelopment: “Mexico cannot service 
its foreign debt from the proceeds of producing nontradables. These are traded in 
pesos. It has instead to shift resources away from the nontradable sector to 
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produce tradable output in order to procure the dollars for servicing the debt (...) 
The process (...) can create a negative feedback loop that leads to resource 
misallocation in soft-currency countries (...) This shift of resources represents 
misallocation and produces inefficiency and output losses (...) Distortions 
inherent in free currency markets lead to a systematic devaluation of soft 
currencies – to „high“ nominal exchange rates. Devaluation of the exchange rate 
means increasing prices of tradables and leads to increased exports. But not all 
exports are a bargain to produce compared to the alternative of producing 
nontradables (...) Countries graduate from being exporters of sugar and copra to 
exporting their teak forests, and on to systematically exporting nurses and 
doctors, while they remain underdeveloped all the same. If this happens, it may 
represent competitive devaluation trade as opposed to comparative advantage 
trade.“ (Yotopoulos and Sawada, 2005) 
The authors further explain their ideas by an econometric analysis of 
economic growth rates in 62 countries from 1970 onwards that shows how this 
process of competitive devaluation trade leads to stagnation. They also present an 
economic model in the tradition of Paul Krugman that shows how currency 
substitution triggers financial crises. In their 2005 paper, the authors show the 
relevance of their theories with time series data from 153 countries. Thus, if they 
are correct, a high ratio between purchasing power and GDP at exchange rates, 
i.e. an under-valued currency, will lead to development stagnation. The countries 
with the strongest currencies, like Denmark, the UK, Sweden, are typical centers 
of the capitalist world economy with a favorable ratio of tradables to non-
tradables, while the countries with a Eurostat “good” low price level, like Turkey, 
are countries with an unfavorable relation between tradables and non-tradables, 
suffering from what neo-Marxists like to call “unequal transfer” or “unequal 
exchange” (price reform/low international price level). 
              In addition to the above specified dependency theory and world systems 
theory arguments, urbanization positively affects Lisbon Process Index Indicator. 
Ceteris paribus, World Bank pension reforms will be negatively related to the 
process:
Table 1: the determinants of the global Lisbon process 
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1
 1,4597
1
0,5684            
t-test and 
direction of 
influence 
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2,2870
1,7035 -
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-
3,0694
-
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direction of 
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2,1267 1,0458 3,1392 5,2303 2,9020 0,1014 9,4211 16,986
3
5,3166 9,3896 3,4679 7,3275 0,0601
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direction of 
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,5
1,4583 1,0226 1,7718 2,2870 1,7035 0,3185 3,0694 4,1214 2,3058 3,0642 1,8622 2,7069 0,2451
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freedom
121,00
00
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probability 
0,1473 0,3085 0,0790 0,0239 0,0910 0,7507 0,0026 0,0001 0,0228 0,0027 0,0650 0,0078 0,8068
F equation 25,895
1
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1
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1
25,895
1
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1
25,895
1
25,895
1
25,895
1
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error
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equation
0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000
Legend: As in all EXCEL 7.0 outprints, first row: un-standardized regression 
coefficients, second row: standard errors, second last row: t-Test and direction of 
the influence. The values immediately below the standard errors are R
^2
 (third 
row, left side entry), F, and degrees of freedom (fourth row). Below that: ss reg; ss 
resid, i.e. the sum of squares of the regression and the sum of squares of the 
residuals. The right-hand entry in the third row is the standard error of the 
estimate y. Below the EXCEL outprints; we present materials for the t-test and the 
F-test for our regression results 
                The causal links of the above Table can be further specified in the 
following graphs. They portray the determinants of the global Lisbon Process 
Indicator (Graph 3 and Graph 4) 
Graph 3: the final causal model 
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Graph 4: the determinants of the global „Lisbon process“ 
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The summarizing Table 2 finally shows the rankings of the highly developed 
countries in the global Lisbon process. European decision makers would be well 
advised to re-think their strategies, indeed. Not the United States (rank on the 
global Lisbon scale – 38) should be the target country, but the European welfare 
democracies Switzerland, Iceland, Austria, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland, 
the Netherlands, and Ireland, who all maximized the Lisbon process, combining 
its 17 different components. 
Pushing Europe downwards the path of falling comparative prices will only 
increase the growth impediments of the growingly multicultural Europe: 
Table 3: The global Lisbon race 
Country code Global Lisbon 
Index
world rank country group 
Switzerland 0,82715 1 EEA/EFTA 
Iceland 0,81502 2 EEA/EFTA 
Austria 0,81147 3 EU-27 
Sweden 0,807 4 EU-27 
Norway 0,80098 5 EEA/EFTA 
Denmark 0,79661 6 EU-27 
Finland 0,77986 7 EU-27 
Netherlands 0,7726 8 EU-27 
Ireland 0,76347 9 EU-27 
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Japan 0,76012 10 other OECD democracies 
Canada 0,75274 13 other OECD democracies 
Cyprus 0,75226 14 EU-27 
Germany 0,75064 15 EU-27 
Luxembourg 0,74795 16 EU-27 
Italy 0,74482 17 EU-27 
New Zealand 0,74296 18 other OECD democracies 
Slovenia 0,73988 19 EU-27 
France 0,73665 21 EU-27 
United Kingdom 0,73603 23 EU-27 
Belgium 0,73226 24 EU-27 
Spain 0,73157 25 EU-27 
Portugal 0,72986 26 EU-27 
Australia 0,72463 27 other OECD democracies 
Israel 0,69906 32 other OECD democracies 
Greece 0,68434 34 EU-27 
Hungary 0,6801 36 EU-27 
United States 0,6761 38 other OECD democracies 
Poland 0,66212 42 EU-27 
Slovakia 0,66206 43 EU-27 
Latvia 0,66192 44 EU-27 
Lithuania 0,6563 47 EU-27 
Croatia 0,6423 49 EU-candidate 
Romania 0,6406 51 EU-27 
Bulgaria 0,62485 60 EU-27 
Estonia 0,62176 63 EU-27 
Czech Republic 0,61236 69 EU-27 
Turkey 0,5676 80 EU-candidate 
Nota bene, our analysis shows that such a socio-liberal alternative is well 
compatible with the integration of Europe’s sizeable Muslim minorities. 
Internet sources: 
http://www.lalisio.com/members/m_TAUSCH/publications/114986208075/11498
6228444/?use_session=True&browser_type=Explorer&-C=&language=en
http://www.cgdev.org/content/expert/detail/2699/
http://www.worldbank.org/research/growth/GDNdata.htm  
http://laborsta.ilo.org/
http://utip.gov.utexas.edu/
Sources provided by the ILO, the UTIP project at the University of Texas, and the 
World Bank were used in this essay. These analyses of the dynamics in the world 
system calculated the time series correlations of globalization, economic growth 
(Global Development Network Growth Database, William Easterly and Mirvat 
Sewadeh, World Bank), unemployment (Laborsta ILO), and inequality (UTIP, 
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University of Texas Inequality Project, Theil indices of inequality, based on 
wages in 21 economic sectors) since 1980. 
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